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THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA:
THE 1975 GENEVA SESSION
By John R. Stevenson * * and
BernardH. Oxman ****

The second substantive session of the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea was held at Geneva from March 26 to May 10, 1975.
It was decided at the outset that this would be a negotiating session. There
was no general debate. Few formal meetings were held. Even informal
working groups of the whole tended to rely on smaller groups the work of
which was necessarily removed from public view. Progress, in many
respects substantial progress, was made toward producing generally acceptable texts in this way. However, the Conference did not complete the
negotiation of a new Law of the Sea Convention or approved texts.
The Conference has recommended to the United Nations General Assembly that another session be held in early 1976, and that this session be
authorized to convene a further session in 1976 if necessary.' It also requested that arrangements be made to afford interpretation and other
logistical support to informal intersessional work, plans for which were
already well underway at the end of the Geneva session.
The principal procedural result of the Geneva session was the preparation
of informal single texts covering all substantive subjects before the Conference. 2 Pursuant to the recommendation of the Conference President,
endorsed by the Conference by consensus, the single texts were prepared
by the Chairmen of the three Main Committees. They are intended to
serve as a basis for negotiation of a comprehensive treaty and do not represent agreed articles or consensus texts; they represent the judgment of
0 This article is a sequel to Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparationsfor the Law of the
Sea Conference, 68 AJIL 1 (1974), and The Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea: the 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AJIL 1 (1975). The views expressed
herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of State or the U.S. Government.
* Of the Board of Editors. Member of the New York Bar. Until May 10, 1975,
Ambassador, Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference
and Chief of U.S. Delegation.
•***Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans, Environment and Scientific Affairs, U.S.
Department of State; U.S. Representative in Committee II, Geneva Session of Law of
the Sea Conference.
1 Letter of May 19, 1975 from the President of the Conference to the President of
the General Assembly, UN Doe. A/10121, June 18, 1975.
2 Informal Single Negotiating Text, A/CONF.62/WP.8, May 7, 1975 (hereinafter
SNT); reprinted at 14 ILM 682 (1975). Its three PAnTs contain the submissions of the

Chairmen of the three Main Committees; these in turn are also divided into parts. The
three main PARrs are referred to herein in upper case.
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Committee Chairmen, based on their assessment of the negotiations thus
far, as to the appropriate starting point for further negotiations during the
intersessional period and at the next session. The Co-Chairmen of the
Informal Working Group on Settlement of Disputes also submitted a text
to the President of the Conference. The President prepared and circulated
a single negotiating text on dispute settlement some months later.3
Since the single negotiating texts of the Main Committee Chairman were
distributed on the last day of the session, they were not the subject of
debate or negotiation as such. However, in some important respects they
do reflect a basis for agreement that emerged in informal negotiations.
This is particularly true of the Committee II text, which took account of
the texts on the economic zone that emerged from the daily meetings of
the Informal Group of Juridical Experts from some 40 nations from all
regions (chaired by Minister Jens Evensen of Norway and known as the
"Evensen Group") and complementary work of the Group of 77 (now composed of over 100 developing countries); texts worked out by informal
groups set up by the Chairman of Committee II on a wealth of detailed
provisions regarding the territorial sea and the high seas; a text on straits
prepared by an informal group of moderate nations from all regions chaired
by Fiji and the United Kingdom; and other negotiations.
A detailed analysis of the single negotiating texts is beyond the scope of
this article. However, an examination of these texts can provide a useful
basis for explaining the work done at Geneva and for discussing some of
the problems the Conference faces. Moreover, it would not be surprising
to find many of the provisions of these texts in the eventual treaty.
The basic structure of the law of the sea which the texts reveal reflects a
possible basis for widespread agreement that has been emerging over
several years. The ten main elements of that possible agreement are:
(1) a maximum 12-mile limit for the territorial sea, over which the coastal
state will have sovereignty, subject to a right of innocent passage, with
some elaboration of the rules of innocent passage;
(2) unimpeded passage of straits used for international navigation for
all vessels and aircraft;
(3) a 200-mile economic zone in which the coastal state exercises
sovereign rights over the exploration, exploitation, conservation, and management of living and nonliving resources and in which all states continue
to enjoy freedoms, in particular of navigation and overflight and other uses
related to navigation and communication; coastal state sovereign rights
over the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the seabed and
subsoil of the continental margin where it extends beyond 200 miles,
coupled with a duty to contribute some international payments in respect
of mineral production in the area of the margin beyond 200 miles;
(4) comprehensive coastal state control of all drilling and of all economic installations in the economic zone;
1 SD.Gp/2nd Session/No.1/Rev.5, May 1, 1975; reprinted at 1,4 ILM 762 (1975).
Informal Single Negotiating Text (Settlement of Disputes). A/CONF.62/WP.9, July
21, 1975.
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(5) some adjustment and modernization of the regime of the high seas,
for example the recognition of the special interest and responsibility of the
state of origin for anadromous species of fish and new rules with respect
to control of unauthorized broadcasting and cooperation in the suppression
of illicit traffic in narcotics;
(6) an elaboration of a concept of island nations as archipelagic states
which includes a precise definition of a new category of archipelagic
waters and a regime of unimpeded passage through archipelagic sealanes
and air routes that traverse the archipelago;
(7) international standards to prevent and control marine pollution,
and limited coastal state enforcement rights with respect to vessel-source
pollution;
(8) specified coastal state and flag state rights and duties with respect
to scientific research in the economic zone and on the continental shelf,
and general provisions regarding international cooperation in marine
scientific research and transfer of marine technology;
(9) an international regime and machinery to deal with the exploration
and exploitation of seabed resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (that is, beyond the economic zone or continental margin);
(10) a system for peaceful third-party settlement of disputes regarding
the interpretation or application of the Convention which have not been
resolved by negotiation or other agreed procedures.
The work of the First Committee embraces point 9. The work of the
Second Committee embraces points 1 through 6. The work of the Third
Committee embraces points 7 and 8. Point 10 is of course related to the
work of all three Main Committees. An informal open ended group on
peaceful settlement of disputes met several times each week.
For the past few years, many delegations have made it clear that their
willingness to accept one or more of these elements is dependent upon the
acceptance of other elements. There are almost as many major linkages in
this regard as there are major issues. Accordingly, while it is convenient
to examine the negotiation in terms of the work of different committees
and groups, one must bear in mind the substantive and political relationships between different issues. There was no evidence in Geneva of
general movement away from the concept of a single comprehensive
treaty-the so-called "package deal." There was, however, encouraging
evidence of a general willingness to avoid unnecessarily complicating the
negotiations with issues not central to the global accommodation being
sought.
THE FnIsT CommrrrEE

Basically, the resources in question in the international area (the "Area")
at this time are the manganese nodules lying at or near the surface of the
deep seabed, mostly at depths of 12,000 feet or more.
The fundamental problem addressed in Committee I was that of reconciling the views of those favoring a system of direct exploitation by the new
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international Authority to be established with the views of those interested
in assuring guaranteed access to, and production of deep seabed minerals
by states and their nationals under reasonable conditions with security of
tenure. The progress made in exploring ways to bridge this gap revolved
around attempts to elaborate "basic conditions" of a system of exploitation.
It was, of course, also recognized that there are other critical elements of
any accommodation, in particular the decisionmaking process of the
Authority.
The Geneva session commenced in a conciliatory mood. The Group of
77 took the view that it had made an important concession at Caracas in
agreeing to include basic conditions of exploitation in the treaty. Moreover, its leadership indicated that there might be some new flexibility on
decisionmaking and other issues related to the structure and procedures of
the international Authority (usually referred to as international "machinery"
issues). Others also came to Geneva prepared to be more flexible on
issues of direct concern to the developing countries. The United States
Delegation expressed its willingness to consider basic conditions in the
treaty as opposed to detailed regulatory provisions (on the condition that
detailed regulations for the provisional period would be adopted by the
Conference) and to consider a system of joint ventures, with the possibility
of profit sharing, as the single method of exploitation.
The Committee devoted the first half of the session to consideration in
its Working Group of basic conditions of exploitation. The Group agreed
to discuss basic conditions applicable to joint ventures, recognizing that
the Group of 77 reserved its position on whether the Authority would
directly exploit. A consensus emerged that the legal problems involved in
establishing equity joint ventures might be very difficult. Accordingly,
the Chairman of the Working Group undertook to prepare a draft set of
basic conditions that would be applicable to a contractual rather than an
equity joint venture system.
The effort to find a set of basic conditions that would at the same time
accommodate the desires for direct and effective control and for guaranteed access was arduous. New means seemed necessary for resolving the
dilemma. Accordingly, in the Working Group, the United States explored
a system for the reservation of areas: under this "banking system," an
applicant for a joint venture would submit two mine sites of equal size,
one of which the Authority would designate as a reserved area. With respect to the reserved areas, the Authority could negotiate with any state
or its nationals for the most favorable financial terms and commitments to
transfer technology. With respect to the other area, arrangements between
the Authority and the applicant would be made in accordance with specifled provisions in the treaty and basic conditions.
At the same time that the Group of 77 was considering the idea of a
banking system, the U.S.S.R. introduced a draft of basic conditions that
would be applicable to a parallel system in which the Authority would
directly exploit a portion of the seabed by itself or under contract with
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private entities, while another portion of the area would be reserved exclusively for state access.At midsession the Chairman of the Working Group introduced a personal
draft of basic conditions that focused primarily on a contractual joint venture system, including reservation of areas for exploitation by states and
for direct exploitation by the Authority. This parallel system was intensively considered by the Group of 77, which eventually rejected the
concept of designating areas solely for state exploitation and also rejected
the parallel system as elaborated in the draft.
With little time left, the Chairman deleted these aspects of his draft of
basic conditions from the text which he submitted to the Chairman of the
First Committee, and which appears as Annex I of the single negotiating
text. The deadline for the text came at precisely the wrong time to permit
any further reconciliation of positions.
A similar problem existed with respect to the rest of the First Committee
single negotiating text. At the request of the Committee Chairman, the
Working Group Chairman prepared a first draft which largely reflected
developing country positions. He then began intensive private consultations which showed every promise of producing a possible basis for agreement. By the time the Working Group Chairman had a sufficient basis to
prepare and to submit a revised text, the deadline bad been passed. Accordingly, while widely distributed among Conference participants, the
revised text of the Working Group Chairman (the "Pinto text"), which
reflected his conclusions from intensive consultations, is not presented in
the single negotiating text.
The first part of the Committee I single negotiating text, which contains
nineteen articles dealing with the legal regime for the deep seabed, embodies treaty articles on which both the UN Seabed Committee and the
Caracas session of the Conference concentrated and reflects greater progress
toward a consensus than the remaining articles on the Authority and the
annexes on the system of exploitation.
The single negotiating text does indicate certain steps taken in the
negotiation toward an eventual accommodation on the machinery issues
dealt with in the second part of the text. While these largely continue to
reflect the views of the Group of 77 on the nature of the accommodation,
the means for achieving that accommodation can be discerned in the text.
Three points are critical.
First, a comparison of Article 26 and Article 28 indicates that a Council
of limited size, rather than a plenary Assembly, will make many of the
important decisions regarding supervision of resource activities. Negotiations are likely to focus on the degree to which the Assembly or the Contracting Parties can override or lay down guidelines controlling such
decisions.
Secondly, Article 27 provides for the inclusion within the 36-member
Council of six members with substantial investment, or possessing advanced
4 A/CONF.62/C.1/L.12, March 21, 1975.
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technology being used, in exploration and exploitation of the Area, or which
are major importers of landbased minerals also produced from the Area;
it also requires that decisions on important questions be taken by a majority of two-thirds plus one. This reflects a willingness to depart in principle from selection solely on the basis of equitable geographic representation. As a practical matter, however, the limitation to six in a Council
of 36 and the discretion of the Assembly to elect states meeting the criteria without regard to their relative rank are likely to render the article
unsatisfactory from the standpoint of those countries with the greatest potential investment and the most advanced technology. Negotiations are
likely to focus on the required voting majority (in the Pinto text, threequarters) and on the number and basis of selection of the developed
countries on the Council (the Pinto text requires nine, comprising the
most industrialized countries with substantial investment in or substantial
technology with respect to the Area and its development).
Thirdly, Article 32 establishes a special tribunal with comprehensive
jurisdiction over disputes not only between states parties, but between a
state or a private contractor and the Authority. Article 58 makes clear
that this includes review of actions by the Authority and its organs. Negotiations are likely to focus on (i) the relationship of this review to the
distribution of powers in the Authority and to the general dispute settlement articles of the Law of the Sea Convention and (ii) the permissibility
of contractual arrangements that seek to circumvent review by the tribunal.
It would appear that negotiations on these and related articles will continue to involve the demand, reflected in Article 26, that the Assembly be
the "supreme policy-making organ of the Authority." Article 28 provides
that the Council "shall act in a manner consistent with general guidelines
and policy directions laid down by the Assembly:' Any protection of industrial country interests built into the Council will be essentially nugatory
if Council decisions may be reversed or circumscribed by an Assembly
operating on a one-nation one-vote principle.
Article 28 does not provide for review of Council rules, regulations, and
procedures by Contracting Parties before they enter into force; yet a direct role for Contracting Parties may be one of the best ways to achieve an
accommodation of the objective of broad review and concerns about the
role of the Assembly.
The views of landbased producers of minerals found in manganese nodules continue to dominate the philosophy of the text; this is manifested in
particular by the absence of any express requirement that exploitation that
satisfies the necessary treaty conditions should be permitted (aside from
the requirement that the Authority enter into joint ventures in respect of
the first "ten economically viable mining sites")." However, consumer
interests have in fact made themselves felt increasingly among both developed and developing countries. Thus, while Article 30 would establish
an Economic Planning Commission that could make recommendations
5 SNT, PAnT I, Art. 22.
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to the Council to protect landbased producers, the criterion of protecting
only "developing countries whose economies substantially depend on the
revenues derived from the export of minerals" also derived from the Area
and the admonition to bear in mind "the interests of both consuming and
land-based mineral producing countries" reflect a continuing and growing
recognition that countries with weak but developing economies may be
hurt if supplies are kept artificially low and prices artificially high.
The article of the Committee I text most critical to progress in the negotiations is Article 22, which provides that exploitation shall be conducted
directly by the Authority, which "may, if it considers it appropriate," enter
into arrangements with states or private parties for this purpose. Unless
there is a substantial qualification of this article to provide for assured
access and production by states and their nationals, an underlying accommodation will not have been achieved.
There is good reason to believe that the will to find such a breakthrough
is present; it is widespread although perhaps not articulated with sufficient
vigor in the Group of 77. Perhaps the best example of this positive will
is reflected by the restraint shown on the issue of voting a new moratorium
on deep seabed exploitation. The UN General Assembly resolution 6 on
this matter was passed over the negative votes of the United States and
other industrialized countries. Despite strong efforts by some in the
Group of 77 to produce a new moratorium resolution, it was in fact recognized that raising this divisive issue could have adverse consequences for
the negotiations. Instead, the President of the Conference, on the last day
of the Geneva session, made a statement on the issue in which he said,
inter alia:
I should like to make a fervent appeal to all States to refrain from
taking any action, and also to use iheir powers to restrain their nationals from taking any action or adopting any measures, which would
place in jeopardy the conclusion of a universally acceptable treaty
of a just and equitable nature.
THE SECOND Com

rrTTE

By far the largest and most diverse number of issues and the disposition of the most vital and valuable resources of the oceans at this time
were entrusted to the Second Committee._ It entered the Geneva session
with a paper developed at Caracas to reflect the "main trends" of the discussion and which set out a clear and limited number of alternatives on
virtually every issue.7 That paper made orderly negotiation possible.
Eight weeks later, the Chairman of Committee II produced a single text
that, to a varying yet significant degree, does reflect actual negotiating
progress made under the auspices of the Committee officers and in informal but representative groups. Those who cited the sheer number of
6 GA Res. 2574D (XXIV); GAOR, 24th Sess., Surp. 30, at 11, UN Doc. A/7630

(1969).
7A/CONF.62/C.2/WP.1.
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isues involved as the basis for predicting an interminable and unmanageable negotiation have not yet been proven wrong. But with the Committee H single negotiating text as the point of departure, there is every
reason to believe that with restraint, careful intersessional negotiation, and
procedures designed to encourage the widest possible agreement, a successful result in this Committee is within reach.
The basic structure of a 12-mile maximum territorial sea, unimpeded
passage of straits, and a 200-mile economic zone with sovereign rights over
living and nonliving resources and special treatment for anadromous species (salmon) has now been elaborated by specific texts negotiated in
various groups which were used as a basis for the single negotiating text,
with work continuing on an article on highly migratory species (tuna).
Those texts have not been agreed to by the Conference as a whole but
do reflect negotiations among informed and articulate proponents of the
main trends at the Conference and as such may provide a basis for general agreement.
The atmosphere in the Second Committee and related negotiations was
extremely workmanlike. During the review of the Main Trends Paper,8
there was little repetition of positions already known. The major exception concerned persistent efforts by a handful of strait states to reopen
that paper; the overwhelming view was that it would be a retrograde step
to concentrate further on the elaboration of alternatives.
Many ad hoc informal groups met to consider specific issues under the
guidance of the Committee officers; while open to all, the groups were
generally of manageable size. An impressive number of informal draft
articles emerged from these groups. These articles are reflected in the
single negotiating text and are likely to command broad support. They
deal with virtually all of the traditional aspects of the territorial sea regime,
including baselines and innocent passage, and the high seas regime, with
some technical changes in and elaborations of the existing regimes. An
informal group of moderates elaborated a set of articles on unimpeded
passage of straits used for international navigation.
The Evensen Group produced a "sixth revision" text on the economic
zone on April 16, 1975, which was circulated to all delegations. This text
reflects a broad trend of opinion. However, its circulation was followed
by efforts by extreme territorialists in the Group of 77 to make the economic zone more coastally oriented and by efforts by landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states to secure greater rights of access to fisheries of neighboring coastal states. On fisheries, both the Evensen text
and the single negotiating text include articles on conservation and full
utilization and an article on anadromous fish (salmon) protecting the
interests of the state of origin. While no agreement has yet emerged on
continental shelf jurisdiction beyond 200 miles, both the latest draft Evensen text (still under consideration) and the single negotiating text reflect
the view of many moderates that coastal state jurisdiction extending to a
8 Ibid.
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precisely defined limit of the continental margin beyond 200 miles coupled
with revenue sharing beyond 200 miles is the only way to achieve widespread agreement.
1. The TerritorialSea and Contiguows Zone
The single negotiating text reflects the general view expressed by delegations in favor of a maximum limit of 12 nautical miles for the territorial
sea and retention of existing regimes regarding baselines and innocent
passage with some elaboration and technical changes. While Ecuador
formally revived a proposal for a 200-mile territorial sea,9 it received little
support; even some supporting statements were ambiguous.
The provisions in the single negotiating text on baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured contain some interesting new
elements 10 not found in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone.-'
Considerable time was devoted to an elaboration of the rule in the 1958
Territorial Sea Convention that passage is innocent so long as it is not1 2
prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state.
While doubts were expressed as to whether an exhaustive list of noninnocent activities could be prepa.red, others noted that the goal of "objectivizing" innocent passage indicated the desirability of attempting such
an approach. Article 16 elaborates a dozen activities which would render
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.88, April 18, 1975.
1-i Article 5 provides that in the case of islands situated on atolls or of islands having
fringing reefs, the baseline shall be the seaward edge of the reef. Article 6 provides that
straight baselines may connect appropriate points along the furthest seaward extent
of the low-water line notwithstanding subsequent regression of the low-water line where,
because of the presence of a delta or other natural conditions, the coastline is highly
unstable. Some attempts were made to define historic bays with greater precision;
it is indicative of the general workmanlike atmosphere that after a few meetings on the
issue it was recognized that the effort could be very time consuming and might adversely affect progress. Attempts by one delegation to introduce a new open-ended
concept of historic waters met widespread opposition.
Article 10, one of a number that takes account of new technological developments,
provides that offshore installations and artificial islands shall not be considered as permanent harbour works for purposes of measuring the territorial sea; it is the logical
companion of Article 48 (economic zone), which expands the scope of a similar rule
in Article 5 of the Continental Shelf Convention and provides that artificial islands, installations, and structures have no territorial sea of their own and that their presence
does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea or other forms of coastal state
jurisdiction.
A similar adaptation to change in the rules of innocent passage is effected in Article
22, also based on the work of an informal Committee II group. The article repeats the
rule in Article 16(2) of the Territorial Sea Convention that the coastal state may take
the steps necessary to prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission to internal waters is subject, but also extends it to "ships proceeding to ... a call at a port
facility outside internal waters."
"115 UST 1606; TIAS No. 5639; 516 UNTS 205; 52 AJIL 851 (1958).
12 Id., Art. 14.
9
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passage
prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal
3
state.1
. The right of the coastal state to regulate innocent passage was
not dealt
with in detail in the Territorial Sea Convention. Article 18 of the single
negotiating text elaborates the scope of this regulatory power and deals
with both navigational safety and prevention of pollution; it also contains
a proviso that coastal state laws and regulations "shall not apply to or
affect the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships
or matters regulated by generally accepted international rules unless
specifically authorized by such rules." This proviso is likely to be controversial. While the text of Article 20, paragraph 3 in the Committee
III draft on Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment is
unclear, its intended effect is apparently to give the coastal state more
regulatory latitude to adopt higher standards in the territorial sea, provided they do not hamper innocent passage. Article 21 of the territorial
sea chapter, in addition to specifying that the coastal state shall not discriminate in form or in fact against the ships of any state or against ships
carrying cargoes to, from, or on behalf of any state, provides that the
coastal state shall not "hamper" innocent passage or "impose requirements
on foreign ships which have the practical effect of denying or prejudicing
the right of innocent passage." The complex nature of the problem of
pollution regulation was widely recognized when a few states proposed
the superficially enticing idea of stating that pollution is not innocent.
Article 23 provides that a ship that does not comply with coastal state
"laws and regulations concerning navigation" shall be liable for any damage
caused to the coastal state. It also provides for coastal state liability if
it "acts in a manner contrary to the provisions of these articles and loss
or damage results to any foreign ship exercising the right of innocent
passage."
After some confusion, a distinction was made between the exercise of
customs and fiscal jurisdiction over offshore installations and the rights
associated with the traditional contiguous zone."4 Thus, both the Evensen
text and the single negotiating text specify that the coastal state can establish customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary regulations with respect to
installations under its jurisdiction throughout the economic zone. Nevertheless, a number of states continued to argue in favor of a traditional
contiguous zone, directed at ships, extending somewhat beyond a 12-mile
territorial sea, in which the coastal state may exercise the control necessary
to prevent and punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or
sanitary regulations in its territory or territorial sea; others felt this was
unnecessary. Article 33 would permit such a zone to extend up to 24
13 Those who recognize the humanitarian origins of the law of the sea of ancient
times and its implicit "duty to rescue" are likely to welcome new textual confirmation
in the rule that the list does not apply to specified activities "for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress."
1"See Territorial Sea Convention, note 11 supra, Art. 24.
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nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured.
2. Straits Used for InternationalNavigation
The importance of the straits issue to the overall negotiations has long
been recognized. At Geneva, there was increased sensitivity to the need
to assure passage of such straits and to avoid establishing a basis for arbitrary interference with such passage. For some time, moderates had been
searching for a rational solution which was "neither free transit nor innocent
passage." In other words, a solution which would accommodate both the
interests in passage and the concerns of straits states regarding such problems as navigational safety and pollution. The single negotiating text,
which drew upon the efforts of a group of moderates from all regions,
reflects this trend.
A right of "transit passage" would be established for "straits which are
used for international navigation between one area of the high seas or an
exclusive economic zone and another area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone," except where the strait is formed by an island of
the coastal state and a high seas or economic zone route of similar convenience exists seaward of the island.' 5 "Transit passage is the exercise in
accordance with the provisions of this Part of the freedom of navigation and
overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of
the strait ...." 16 Article 43 prohibits suspension of transit passage.
Virtually all of the remaining provisions deal with the concerns of strait
states. Article 34 specifies that the regime of passage through straits "shall
not in other respects affect the status of the waters forming such straits
nor the exercise by the strait State of its sovereignty or jurisdiction over such
waters...." Article 39 requires vessels and aircraft inter alia to proceed
without delay through the strait; to refrain from the threat or use of force
against a strait state in violation of the UN Charter; to refrain from any
activities other than those incident to their normal modes of continuous
and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by force majeure or by
distress; and to comply with applicable international safety and pollution
regulations. Article 40 permits the straits state to designate and substitute
sealanes and to prescribe traffic separation schemes after adoption of its
proposals by the competent international organization, which "may adopt
only such sealanes and separation schemes as may be agreed with the
strait State."
Article 41 deals with perhaps the most sensitive problem: the regulatory
rights of the strait state. It permits the strait state to make laws and regulations regarding transit passage relating to:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of marine traffic as
provided in article 40;
Is SNT, PART II, Art. 38.

16 ibid.
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(b) the prevention of pollution, giving effect to applicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes and
other noxious substances in the strait;
(c) with respect to fishing vessels, the prevention of fishing, including the stowage of fishing gear;
(d) the taking on board or putting overboard of any commodity,
currency or person in contravention of the customs, fiscal, immigration
or sanitary regulations of the strait State.
It provides that such laws and regulations shall be nondiscriminatory, and
shall not have "the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the
right of transit passage." Foreign ships "shall comply with such laws and
regulations." With respect to the question of remedies in cases where
there is sovereign immunity, that is where warships, government noncommercial ships, and state aircraft are involved, the article provides that
the flag state "shall be responsible for.., loss or damage.., to a strait State
or other State in the vicinity of the strait" resulting from acts by such ships
or aircraft contrary to the Convention or such coastal state laws and regulations.
Article 35 makes clear that the drawing of straight baselines in accordance
with the rules provided for in the territorial sea chapter cannot alter passage
rights in straits used for international navigation established in the treaty.
This result should be obvious, as baselines have been drawn across navigational channels in very important straits, but the issue was the source of
some confusion at Geneva. Since the article makes clear that the straits
chapter does not affect other forms of internal waters and does not alter
the "used for international navigation" test, it may be hoped that the concerns expressed have been allayed.
Article 44 applies the regime of nonsuspendable innocent passage, as in
the Territorial Sea Convention,1"7 in straits used for international navigation
other than those to which transit passage applies; such other straits include
straits used for international navigation between an area of the high seas
or economic zone and the territorial sea of a foreign state.
3. The Economic Zone
While foreshadowed by other developments in the past few decades,
the economic zone is a new concept of critical importance. The articles
that would establish a 200-mile economic zone affect more interests of more
states than any other aspect of the single negotiating text. They attempt
to deal comprehensively with activities in an area that embraces perhaps
40% of the sea and in which most of the known hydrocarbons and commercial fisheries of the sea are found. Ships would have to navigate
through the economic zone of a third state to communicate with a majority
of coastal states in the world.
17

Territorial Sea Convention, note 11 supra, Art. 16(4).
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In terms of the actual negotiations, there can be no doubt that the fundamental characteristic of the zone is an accommodation between coastal
state and other interests, with a different balance struck with respect to
different types of activities in the zone. It is most coastal or "territorial"
in its treatment of the sovereign rights of the coastal state over seabed
resources of the zone; it is most free or "international" in its treatment of
navigation, overflight, and similar uses. But even with respect to these
activities, on the one hand, the coastal state sovereign rights are subject to
duties designed to protect other uses "' and the marine environment, 9 and,
on the other hand, the freedoms of all states are subject to traditional high
seas duties 20 and environmental duties, 2' as well as the duty to have "due
regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State" 22
The single negotiating text was influenced by the long negotiations that
resulted in the "sixth revision" Evensen Group text. That group devoted
the better part of its time to the economic zone at Caracas and Geneva, and
between sessions. It included chiefs of delegation in their personal capacity from about 40 of the most active Committee II participants from all
regions and interest groups.
One significant difference between the Evensen text and the single
negotiating text is in Article 45, the "chapeau" which elaborates the rights
of the coastal state in the zone.
Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Evensen Group sixth revision text reads as
follows:
The coastal State has in an area beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea, known as the exclusive economic zone:
(a) Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether renewable
or non-renewable, of the seabed and subsoil and the superjacent
waters;
(b) Jurisdiction with regard to other activities for the economic
exploration and exploitation of the zone, such as the production of
energy from the water, currents and winds;
(c) Jurisdiction as provided for in this Convention with regard to:
(i)the preservation of the marine environment,
ii) scientific research,
(iii) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations
and similar structures, including customs, fiscal, health and immigration
regulations pertaining thereto;
(d) Other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
18 SNT, PART II, Arts. 45(2), 48.
19 Id., Art. 68 (applicable within the 200-mile zone pursuant to Art. 62); see SNT,

PART III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, Arts. 4, 17, 41.
2
0SNT, PART II, Art. 47(2).
21 See SNT, PART III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, Arts.
4, 20, 26, 41.
22SNT, PART II, Art. 47(3).
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Unlike the Evensen text, Article 45 of the single negotiating text 23 does
not distinguish between statements that are intended to establish jurisdic.
tion (e.g., the sovereign rights of the coastal state over resources) and
statements that are intended mainly as a summary indication of rights elaborated elsewhere in the Convention (e.g., pollution and scientific research,
which are within the mandate of Committee III). In particular, Article 45
omits the qualifying words "as provided for in this Convention" in describing coastal state jurisdiction with respect to preservation of the marine
environment, scientific research, and installations, and characterizes scientific research jurisdiction as "exclusive." The effect of course is to prejudge
the outcome of issues and, in particular, to imply comprehensive and unlimited subject-matter jurisdiction where this has not been agreed. At
least where vessel-source pollution is concerned, even the implication is
contrary to the general trend of the negotiations in favor of freedom of
navigation and international standards.
Another significant difference is in Article 47. One of the most difficult
aspects of the Evensen Group's negotiation was the achievement of balance
between the duty of the coastal state to have due regard for navigation and
other freedoms and the duty of states exercising those freedoms to have due
regard for the rights of the coastal state. Article 47 upsets this balance,
probably unintentionally, by providing that "States . . . shall comply with
the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal State in conformity with
the provisions of this Part and other rules of international law." The problem is that this clause appears, not in an article dealing with activities such
as mining or fishing over which the coastal state will have regulatory and
enforcement jurisdiction, but in the article dealing with navigation and
other freedoms which are not in principle subject to coastal state jurisdic.
tion. It will, it is hoped, be recognized that this is largely a drafting
problem.
A third significant difference is that, aside from a cross-reference to the
rights of the coastal state over scientific research, to be elaborated in the
chapters on that subject, the Evensen text does not deal with the issue.
Article 49 of the single negotiating text addresses the issue 2 and, by providing for coastal state consent for "any research concerning the economic
2 Article 45 reads in pertinent part as follows:
1. In an area beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea, described as the exclusive
economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources, whether renewable or non-renewable, of the bed
and subsoil and the superjacent waters;
(b) exclusive rights and jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and use of
artificial islands, installations and structures;
(c) exclusive jurisdiction with regard to:
(i) other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone,
such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds; and
(ii) scientific research;
(d) jurisdiction with regard to the preservation of the marine environment,
including pollution control and abatement;
(e) other rights and duties provided for in the present Convention.
2 Article 71 applies the Article 49 rule mutatis mutandis to research concerning
the continental shelf and undertaken there.

1975]

i=7 1975

GENEVA SESSION

zone and undertaken there," clearly prejudges the main scientific research
issue under negotiation in the Third Committee.
With respect to artificial islands and installations, Article 48, paragraph
1 of the single negotiating text provides:
In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state shall have the
exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of:
(a) artificial islands;
(b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in
article 45 and other economic purposes;
(c) installations and structures which may interfere with the
exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone.
This issue has undergone a very long period of difficult discussion in the
Evensen Group and elsewhere. The text is an attempt to bridge the gap
between those that wished to maintain the strict economic-noneconomic
distinction inherent in the zone and those that did not by resolving the accommodation of conflicting uses problem in favor of the coastal state. It
is clear that all artificial islands and all resource and other economic offshore installations (e.g., artificial deep water ports) are ipso facto subject
to coastal state exclusive rights; however, it is equally clear that the "may
interfere" test in subparagraph (c)"tilts" heavily toward the coastal state
even with respect to noneconomic installations in the economic zone. It
should also be noted that Article 67 gives the coastal state "the exclusive
right to authorize and regulate drilling on the continental shelf for all purposes"; the Article 62 definition of the continental shelf includes the full
200-mile zone. While arms control questions are beyond the scope of the
Law of the Sea Conference, the provisions and prohibitions of the Seabed
Arms Control Treaty 2 are of course also relevant; its parties include the
United Kingdom, United States, and U.S.S.R.
The question of the juridical status and the rights enjoyed by all states
in the economic zone was one of the most difficult aspects of the negotiations. The single negotiating text reflects the clear consensus in favor of
"the freedoms of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine
cables and pipelines and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related
to navigation and communication," 26 on the one hand, and coastal state
11sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources, whether renewable or non-renewable," 27 on the other hand. The problem centered on the "residual rights"
which the Convention does not attribute either to the coastal state or to all
states. This is linked to the question whether the status of the economic
25

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
thereof, 23 UST 701, TIAS No. 7337 (1971). The treaty entered into force in 1972
and2 will, by its terms, be reviewed in 1977.
2
SNT, PAnT I, Art 47(1).
7Id, Art. 45(1) (a).
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zone is high seas (without prejudice, of course, to the specified rights of the
coastal state in the zone).
The solution proposed in the single negotiating text has a number of
elements. On the one hand, Article 73 defines the 'high seas" as excluding
the economic zone, reflecting the often expressed view that the zone is
neither territorial sea nor high seas, but sui generis. On the other hand, it
attempts to reflect the view that the economic zone does not alter in concept the exercise of high seas freedoms being preserved. Article 47 incorporates by reference most of the articles of the high seas chapter (excluding the definition of the high seas, the enumeration of high seas freedoms,
and fishing provisions) and other pertinent rules of international law "in
so far as they are not incompatible with the provisions of this Part."
With respect to the residuum, Article 47(3) provides:
In cases where the present Convention does not attribute rights or
jurisdiction to the coastal State or to other States within the exclusive
economic zone, and a conflict arises between the interests of the coastal
State and any other State or States, the conflict should be resolved on
the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances,
taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved
to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole.
The exclusion of the economic zone from the definition of the high seas
was strongly opposed by some states.
The basic thrust of the economic zone is, of course, resource jurisdiction.
Its most "revolutionary" aspect is the elimination of freedom of fishing and
the substitution of coastal state sovereign rights over the exploration, exploitation, conservation, and management of living resources. Such a
drastic alteration, coupled with the problems associated with the migratory
and other biological characteristics of fish stocks, necessarily raises a number of practical problems that require resolution if a sound and widely
acceptable agreement is to be reached. Therefore, it is not surprising that
most of the articles in the economic zone section deal with fishing.
There are six basic elements in the treatment of fisheries in the single
Inegotiating text:
(1) The "sovereign rights" of the coastal state.28 Fishing is subject to
the jurisdiction and broad regulatory, and management powers of the
coastal state.2 9
(2) The coastal state duty to conserve. It has the duty to determine
the allowable catch and adopt other conservation measures "designed to
maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can
produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors"; to ensure "that the maintenance of the
living resources . . . is not endangered by over-exploitation"; and "to take
into consideration the effects on species associated with or dependent upon
harvested species." 30
28 Ibid.
so Id., Art. 50.

29

Id., Arts. 50,51.
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(3) The coastal state priority allocation and duty to ensure optimum
utilization. It has the duty to "determine its capacity to harvest the living
resources" of the zone and, where it "does not have the capacity to harvest
the entire allowable catch," to "give other States access to the surplus of
the allowable catch" pursuant to coastal state regulations "consistent with
the provisions of the present Convention." Among the factors the coastal
state "shall take into account" in granting such access is "the need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished
in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks.,

(4) Special provisions for highly migratory species, s2 anadromous
species, 33 catadromous species, 8' marine mammals, 35 and sedentary
species.3 8
(5) Special provisions regarding access of landlocked and "geographically disadvantaged" states to fisheries in the economic zone of their neighbors.3 T These states publicly indicated their disagreement with the Evensen text and the Group of 77 text on the grounds that the access rights were
insufficient.
(6) Comprehensive fisheries enforcement rights for coastal states in
the zone. These include "boarding, inspection, arrest, and judicial prosl Id., Art. 51.
82 Id., Art. 53. With respect to enumerated highly migratory species such as tuna,
the coastal state and other states whose nationals fish such species in the region are
required to "co-operate directly or through appropriate international organizations with
a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of
such species throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic
zone." The Evensen sixth revision text does not contain a precise proposed article on
highly migratory species, which could not be completed due to continuing differences.
3s Id., Art. 54. With respect to anadromous species such as salmon, the states "in
whose rivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the primary interest in and responsibility for such stocks," may establish total allowable catches, regulate fishing for
such stocks within their economic zones and beyond economic zones of other states, and
have the duty to cooperate in minimizing economic dislocation in other states fishing
these stocks, which is the only exception to the rule that fishing for anadromous stocks
"shall be conducted only in waters within exclusive economic zones" (a reference intended in the Evensen text to embrace territorial and internal waters as well). With
respect to anadromous stocks migrating through their economic zones, other states must
"cooperate with the State of origin with regard to the conservation and management of
such stocks."
34 Id., Art. 55. With respect to catadromous species such as eels, there is a provision giving special rights to the "coastal State in whose waters catadromous species
spend the greater part of their life cycle."
5 Id., Art. 53(3).
Nothing in the present Convention shall restrict the right of a coastal State or
international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, regulate and limit the exploitation of marine mammals. States shall co-operate either directly or through
appropriate international organizations with a view to the protection and management of marine mammals.
36 Id., Art. 56. This article excludes sedentary species of the continental shelf from
the application of the economic zone chapter, thus leaving the sovereigu rights of coastal
states under Article 63 unqualified by the economic zone duties.
37 Id., Arts. 57-49; see also Art. 51(3).
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ceedings," provided that arrested vessels and their crews "shall be promptly
released upon the posting of reasonable bond or other security" and that
"penalties for violations of fisheries regulations may not include imprisonment" in the absence of agreement to the contrary.83
The nature of the provisions regarding highly migratory species and the
provisions regarding access of landlocked and "geographically disadvantaged" states were very controversial issues in Geneva and will probably be
the focus of attention on fisheries issues during intersessional consultations.
The question of the delimitation of the economic zone and the continental shelf between neighboring coastal states is a highly divisive one
which, in the last analysis, is essentially bilateral in character. The interest
of the community in general is in providing a legal basis for the peaceful
resolution of the problem by the neighboring states concerned. This can
be achieved through the elaboration of general substantive rules, procedures, or both.89
The approach to delimitation issues in the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention is to lay down the "equidistance/special circumstances" rule and
leave the matter to bilateral negotiation.40 While a different rule is enunciated in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, that judgment (necessarily
limited by the terms on which the case was submitted) is also primarily
concerned with substance." At present, whatever the merits of their arguments, it is clear that some states are relying on the special circumstances
exception in the Continental Shelf Convention, the North Sea Continental
Shelfs cases judgment, or both, as a basis for opposing the automatic application of the equidistance principle. There are widely varying views on
both the substance and application of international law on the issue.
s Id., Art. 60.
9 Where fisheries are concerned, delimitation Is not the only Issue. There is an
obvious need to agree upon coordinated conservation and allocation measures for stocks
which migrate across national limits; Article 52 confirms this need. To some extent,
similar considerations are relevant in the case of fluid nonliving resources.
40 Convention on the Continental Shelf; 15 UST 471; TIAS No. 5578; 499 UNTS 311;
52 AJIL 858 (1958). Art. 6.
41
North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, [1969] ICJ RP. 3, (Special Agreements
submitting the cases at 7-8; findings at 53-54). The Special Agreements submitting the
cases requested the Court to decide what "principles and rules of international law are
applicable to the delimitation" as between the parties, specifying that the parties would
"delimit the continental shelf in the North Sea as between their countries by agreement
in pursuance of the decision requested" from the Court. The Court decided that the
equidistance rule was not opposable to the Federal Republic of Cermany, which was
not a party to the Continental Shelf Convention; found that there is "no other single
method of delimitation the use of which is in all circumstances obligatory"; and elaborated substantive criteria based on a theory of "natural prolongation" to be applied by
the Federal Republic, Denmark, and the Netherlands in delimiting "by agreement" their
respective areas of jurisdiction. SNT Article 61(1) draws upon that part of paragraph
C(1) of the Judgment which states, "delimitation is to be effected by agreement In
accordance with equitable principles, and taking into account all of the relevant circumstances," omits the substantive geographic qualifications and criteria in the Judgment, but adds the language, "employing, where appropriate, the median or equidistance line."
3
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Article 61 and the essentially identical Article 70 regarding the continental shelf place primary emphasis on procedure; they emphasize the
community interest in keeping the peace. Article 61 provides in pertinent
part:
(1) The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between adjacent or opposite States shall be effected by agreement in accordance
with equitable principles, employing, where appropriate, the median
or equidistance line, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances.
(2) If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of
time, the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for
in Part... (settlement of disputes).
(3) Pending agreement, no State is entitled to extend its exclusive
economic zone beyond the median line or the equidistance line.
The viability of paragraph 3 as an interim rule is largely dependent upon
the right of a state to resort to compulsory dispute settlement under paragraph 2 to determine that "a reasonable period of time" has elapsed and
to resolve the issue; otherwise the party that prefers the median or equidistant line could simply refuse to agree on another line. In effect, the
two paragraphs largely relieve the pressure on states to take potentially
conflicting steps in disputed areas in order to protect their claims. It is
not clear what the reaction to this imaginative new approach will be.
There was some opposition in the Dispute Settlement Group to compulsory
dispute settlement of maritime boundaries between neighboring states. 2
Since boundary disputes can be among the most dangerous, the substantial
contribution that the procedural ideas underlying draft Articles 61 and 70
could make to avoiding such dangers should be carefully weighed.
The differences in the negotiations over the entitlement of small islands
to an economic zone and continental shelf are, in practical terms, closely
linked to the delimitation problem. No specific reference is made to islands
in the articles on delimitation. The issue would presumbaly be raised
under the reference to "equitable principles" and "all the relevant circumstances" in Articles 61 and 70. However, Article 132 of the single negotiating text provides, "Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf."
4. The ContinentalShelf
The basic and still unresolved issue regarding the continental shelf is
whether it would be defined to include continental margin areas beyond
200 miles, thereby placing seabed resource exploration and exploitation of
the entire margin under coastal state jurisdiction.
4 Annex I, Art. 17(3) (b) of the dispute settlement group text and SNT (Settlement
of Disputes) Art. 18(2) (b), note 3 supra, contain a qualified exception to the compulsory procedures in this connection.
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Articles 62 and 69 reflect the view of many moderates that an accommodation which combines coastal state jurisdiction and a revenue-sharing obligation with respect to mineral exploitation of the margin beyond 200-miles
is the only practical way to protect the general interest in widespread
agreement. There was widespread opposition to revenue sharing with respect to areas within 200 miles.
In response to the concerns of a number of states that the outer edge of
the margin be precisely defined, work is continuing in the Evensen Group
on a more precise definition that might incorporate review by an international commission, which would certify the result to the coastal state
and the international Authority for the seabed.
Article 69 does not specify the amount of revenue sharing, but does
reflect the view of the United States and others that the obligation should
be stated as a percentage of the value of mineral production at the site in
order to ensure greater simplicity and certainty of expectations. It also
reflects the view of some countries that the coastal state might, if it wishes,
make its contribution in kind as a percentage of the "volume of production" at the site. Some states with broad margins argued that a system
of profit sharing would be more feasible, as it would take account of the
need to recover the costs of the large investments likely to be required for
production in deep areas that are far from shore prior to making any fixed
payments to the international community. However, supporters of a
formula based on a percentage of the value of production noted the difficulties in determining profits on a uniform and equitable basis under different economic, accounting, and tax systems.
In order to illustrate how a system of contributions might work and
might accommodate in some measure the views of those advocating profit
sharing, the United States informally presented a specific idea with respect
to revenue sharing from the area beyond 200 miles, based on an increasing
percentage of the value of production at the site. 48
Article 69 also provides for the international Authority to determine the
extent of developing country revenue-sharing obligations. Some states,
including the United States, have indicated that they can support discrimination in the distribution of these funds in favor of developing countries,
but not discriminatory contribution rates. It is, after all, the rate and value
of production that would determine the contribution. The underlying accommodation that revenue sharing represents is that, in exchange for
agreeing to coastal state jurisdiction to the outer edge of the margin, the
international community would receive a share of the benefits of mineral
4

sAfter five years of production at a site, the coastal state's obligation to share
revenues would begin at one percent of wellhead value, and thereafter increase by one
percent per year until it reached five percent in the tenth year, after which it would
remain at five percent. Experts on the U.S. Delegation calculated that for a field producing 700 million barrels of oil through a 20-year depletion period, assuming a value
of $11 per barrel, the total amount of the revenue sharing would be $130 million. The
oil and other minerals themselves, and additional revenues collected by the coastal state,
would of course remain with the coastal state.
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exploitation. Very few developing coastal states are likely to be affected
to a significant degree. The acceptability of this basis of accommodation
on the margin issue would be jeopardized by injecting the broad philosophical and political difficulties inherent in discriminatory rates of contribution.
Perhaps one way around the problem might be to allow some coastal state
flexibility as to the development organizations receiving contributions,
which might include regional development organizations associated with
the United Nations.
The questions of drilling, scientific research on the continental shelf,
sedentary species, and delimitation between opposite and adjacent states
were discussed in connection with the economic zone. While Article 66
would treat installations on the continental shelf beyond the economic
zone in the same manner as those within the zone, there was sentiment for
taking, with respect to the area beyond 200 miles, the approach of Article 5
of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, which refers to coastal state
jurisdiction only in respect of installations for the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the continental shelf.
5. The High Seas
The most important question raised by the high seas chapter is the
definition of the high seas. The implications of defining the high seas to
exclude the economic zone have been discussed in connection with the
economic zone.
Informal consultations on the high seas held by Committee II were very
productive. While the questions of the definition of the high seas, high
seas freedoms, and living resources were deferred pending consideration
of the economic zone, single draft texts on which the single negotiating
text is based were prepared by the participants. These texts are largely
derived from the existing high seas regime as codified in the 1958 High
5
Seas Convention, 4 with some elaborations.4
Articles 103 and 104, taken together, make it clear that freedom of fishing
on the high seas beyond the economic zone is "subject to ...the duty to
adopt, or to cooperate with other States in adopting, such measures for their
respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living
44Convention on the High Seas; 13 UST 2312; TIAS No. 5200; 450 UNTS 82; 52

AJIL 842 (1958).
45Notable elaborations are contained in Article 80, which develops the obligations
of the flag state with respect to ships flying its flag; Article 94, which provides for international cooperation in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; Article 95, which subjects any person engaged in "unauthorized
broadcasting" on the high seas to arrest and prosecution, inter alia, by a state "where the
transmissions can be received or . ..where radio communication is suffering interference"; Article 97, which applies the coastal state right of hot pursuit to violations of
applicable coastal state laws and regulations in the economic zone or on the continental
shelf, including safety zones around continental shelf installations; and Article 100,
which expands the obligation of flag states to ensure that their vessels do not break or
injure submarine cables and pipelines.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 69

resources of the high seas. In addition, where the same stock or stocks
of associated species occur both within the economic zone and "in an area
beyond and adjacent to the zone," Article 52(2) provides for the coastal
state and states fishing such stocks in the adjacent area to seek to agree on
conservation measures in the adjacent area. While this provision does not
speak of a "special interest" of the coastal state in conservation, its practical
effect, particularly-if there is compulsory dispute settlement, would be to
provide some protection of the conservation interests of the coastal state,
The special treatment for certain types of species is elaborated in the economic zone and continental shelf articles."6
6. Landlocked States
Article 109 provides that landlocked states "shall have the right of access
to and from the sea for the purpose of exercising the rights provided for
in the present Convention." Terms and conditions would be specified in
bilateral, subregional, or regional agreements. Transit states "have the
right to take all measures to ensure that the rights provided for in this Part
shall in no way infringe their legitimate interests." Traffic in transit would
be exempt from customs duties, taxes, and charges other than those for
specific services rendered.' 7
The importance of the issue of access to and from the sea is related not
only to the increased number of landlocked states in the international community, particularly in Africa, but to the fact that the means and commercial incentives in developing coastal states for transporting the trade
of developing landlocked states may not be entirely equal to the need.4 8
Landlocked states are understandably concerned about ensuring that
their rights are unambiguous. Transit states are understandably concerned about assuming treaty obligations they would have difficulty meeting. Negotiations on this issue in Geneva were difficult, although there
was broad agreement on the need to provide access to the sea for landlocked states; with one or two exceptions, there was no evidence of
resistance in principle to a clear right of access. African coastal and landlocked states are the most broadly affected; it is notable that they have
shown considerable sensitivity and statesmanship on this issue.
7. Archipelagos
The single negotiating text seeks to accommodate the desire of certain
island nations to enclose the waters of their archipelagos with the interests
of other nations in protecting the seas from unreasonably broad claims and
in protecting navigation and overflight.
4B See notes 32-36, supra.
'r SNT, PAT I1,
Art. 111.
48 "Transit States may request the land-locked States concerned to co-operate In con-

structing or improving" means of transport to give effect to the right of access.
113.

Id., Art.
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Article 117 provides that "'archipelagic State' means a State constituted
wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands." The
concept does not apply to islands of continental states. There was strong
opposition to any such extension of the concept. The purpose of Article
131, which says the archipelago provisions are "without prejudice to the
status of oceanic archipelagos forming an integral part of the territory of
a continental State," is unclear.
The articles establish criteria in terms of length of line and land-to-water
ratio for drawing lines around an island group.49 Waters within such lines
are "archipelagic waters" where the archipelagic state exercises sovereignty
"subject to the provisions of this section." 50 The territorial sea, contiguous
zone, economic zone, and continental shelf would be measured seaward of
these lines.5'
Article 124 establishes a right of "archipelagic sealanes passage" in sealanes and air routes designated by the archipelagic state "suitable for the
safe, continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft"
through archipelagic waters. Criteria for the width and location of lanes
are elaborated. Article 124(3) defines archipelagic sealanes passage as
follows:
Archipelagic sealanes passage is the exercise in accordance with the
provisions of the present Convention of the rights of navigation and
overflight in the normal mode for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit through an archipelago between one part of the high
seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas
or an exclusive economic zone.
The provisions regarding the duties of states exercising the right of
archipelagic sealanes passage,52 the designation and international review
of sealanes and traffic separation schemes, 5 3 and the regulatory rights of the
archipelagic states with respect to such passage 54 are similar to the provisions regarding transit passage of straits.
In archipelagic waters outside sealanes and air routes, there would be a
right of innocent passage subject to temporary and nondiscriminatory suspension by the archipelagic state where essential for the protection of its
security. 5 There are also special provisions regarding traditional fishing
rights 5 and communication between two parts of the territory 57 of an
immediately adjacent neighboring state.
The question of archipelagos is a good example of the delicate problem
of promoting a widely acceptable treaty. Inclusion of the concept is of
overriding concern to a limited number of states. However, unless the
definition is carefully circumscribed and adequate navigation and overflight
rights are guaranteed, inclusion of the concept would seriously reduce the
chances of a widely acceptable treaty.
49 Id., Art. 118.
61 Id., Art. 119.
53 Id., Art. 124.
55 Id., Art. 123.
7 Id., Art. 118(7).

5o0d., Art. 120.
52.Id., Art. 125.

54 Id., Art. 128.
Id., Art. 122.
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8. Regime of Islands
As noted before, Article 132 of the single negotiating text provides that
"rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf." Aside from
this, all the substantive rules of the Convention applicable to other land
territory also apply to an island, defined as a "naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide."
The effect of this text, and the reactions of states to it, are unclear. For
example, what if it is the presence of marine resources and the desalination
of sea water that render habitation and economic life possible?
9. Enclosed and Semienclosed Seas
Article 134 provides for cooperation among states bordering enclosed or
semienclosed seas in the exercise of their rights and duties under the Convention. Specific reference is made in this regard to coordination with
respect to living resources, preservation of the marine environment, and
scientific research. Article 135 makes clear that these provisions do not
affect the rights and duties of coastal or other states under other provisions of the Convention.
Article 134 is perhaps a somewhat narrower example of the general need
for cooperation among neighboring coastal states. It does, however, tend
to reflect some efforts already underway or under consideration in such
areas as the North Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Caribbean Sea, and the
Persian Gulf.
10. TerritoriesUnder ForeignOccupationor ColonialDomination
The very heading "territories under foreign occupation or colonial domination" suggests political issues more suitable for discussion in the political
organs of the United Nations than in connection with a Convention on the
Law of the Sea. The main thrust of Article 136 is to vest offshore resource
rights under the Convention in the inhabitants of territories under foreign
occupation or colonial domination, a UN Trust Territory, or a territory
administered by the UN, "to be exercised by them for their own benefit."
There are few aspects of Article 136 that would be susceptible of interpretation without reference to a particular political point of view. For
example, where "a dispute over the sovereignty of a territory under foreign
occupation or colonial domination exists," coastal state resource rights "shall
11On a more technical level, since even low tide elevations along the coast can be
used for establishing baselines under some circumstances (see Arts. 4 and 12), Article
132 arguably should not affect the use of rocks in such situations. Moreover, the relationship to the archipelago articles is unclear; surely, encouraging governments whose
populations are dependent on the resources around small islands to seek to resolve their
problem through expansion of the archipelago concept would have exactly the opposite
effect of that intended by Article 132, and could further complicate the already uncertain situation regarding the ultimate acceptability of an archipelago concept.
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not be exercised until such dispute is settled in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." It would seem
that, when there is a sovereignty dispute, the disputed area in question
would normally be regarded by the claimant state that does not actually
control the area as being "under foreign occupation," if not "colonial domination." Do the inhabitants benefit by this? Might third states benefit?
It is perhaps useful to remember that the original stimulus for this article
was the significant persistence of colonialism in Africa. That is now
changing rapidly. It is also useful to remember that freedom of choice is
now the rule, not the exception, applied by former colonial powers to their
remaining dependencies. In some cases, these dependencies have clearly
indicated a preference to maintain that status; in others, the process is now
developing; in still others, the United Nations itself has authorized the
non-self-governing relationship. In all these situations, a state cannot
assume treaty obligations and then hope that the inhabitants of a dependency will, in the exercise of rights, ensure that the obligations are
met. Moreover, precisely how can these inhabitants deal with foreign
powers that might encroach upon those rights, if the presumably more
powerful "metropolitan" power is prohibited from exercising the rights?
For Americans, particularly as we enter our bicentennial year, the anticolonial sentiments of Article 136 strike a responsive chord. For many
countries of the world, those sentiments were until recently fundamental
to their national aspirations and not merely their foreign policies. But
the fact remains that, if a state is in illegal control of territory or violating
the international rules applicable to the administration of an area and the
protection of its inhabitants, the issue is broader than offshore resource
jurisdiction and should be dealt with directly in the appropriate forum.
No state will normally concede that it is illegally occupying territory. A
Law of the Sea Convention cannot resolve the problem; it can create confusion that, as a careful analysis of the potential effects of Article 136 will
reveal, could provide a juridical or practical windfall to third states and
accordingly reduce their interest in encouraging a just alteration in the
situation.
11. Settlement of Disputes
Article 137 contains a general cross-reference to the application of the
provisions of the dispute-settlement chapter of the Convention. This is a
necessary aspect of any settlement of Committee II issues.
THE Tmm Com
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1. Protectionand Preservationof the Marine Environment
The single negotiating text on protection and preservation of the marine
environment largely reflects the results achieved in Caracas on the general
articles on the subject and the specific results in the Working Group on
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marine pollution in Geneva with respect to monitoring, environmental assessment, landbased pollution, ocean dumping, and pollution from continental shelf activities. In some of these fields such work was not fully
completed. The Evensen Group concentrated on the problem of vesselsource pollution, which was not resolved, although a clear trend against
coastal state standard setting in the economic zone is reflected in the
single negotiating text.
The first chapter, General Provisions, sets out the basic legal obligations
to protect and preserve the marine environment and addresses the difflcult and controversial problem of balancing these obligations against economic considerations and legitimate uses of the sea. These articles provide
in part:
States have the obligation to protect and preserve all the marine
environment.5?
States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources
pursuant to their environmental policies and they shall, in accordance
with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment, take
into account their economic needs and their programmes for economic
development.6
States shall take all necessary measures consistent with this Convention to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment
from any source using for this purpose the best practicable means at
their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities, individually or
jointly, as appropriate, and they shall endeavour to harmonize their
policies in this connexion. 01
States shall take all necessary measures to ensure that marine pollution does not spread outside their national jurisdiction and that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted that they do not
cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment, nor
States exercise sovereign rights
cause pollution beyond the areas where
2
in accordance with this Convention.
The measures taken pursuant to these articles shall deal with all
sources whatsoever of pollution of the marine environment . . . In
taking measures to prevent pollution of the marine environment States
shall have due regard to the legitimate uses of the marine environment, which are not incompatible with the provisions of this Conven-'
tion and shall refrain from unjustifiable interference with such uses.
The second chapter sets out obligations to formulate and elaborate international rules, standards, and recommended practices and procedures for
the prevention of pollution; 64 to cooperate in eliminating the effects of
pollution and preventing or minimizing damage65 and to cooperate in
scientific research and data exchange programs regarding pollution and
59 SNT, PART IH, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, Art. 2.
61 id., Art. 4.
60 Id., Art. 3.
63 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
65 Id., Art. 8.
-Id, Art. 6.
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its remedies 66 and in working out appropriate scientific
criteria for the
67
formulation of international environmental measures.
Chapter Three contains broad provisions on the promotion of scientific,
educational, technical, and other assistance to developing countries for the
preservation of the marine environment and the prevention of pollution.
Such provisions can and should be regarded as an integral part of a global
effort to control marine pollution.
Chapter Four obliges states to "endeavour, as much as is practicable"
to monitor pollution of the marine environment, and to report the results
to the UN Environment Programme or any other competent organization,
"which should make them available to all States." While the qualifying
language is, at least in tone, regrettable, it is notable that states are also
required to keep under surveillance "the effect of any activities which they
permit or in which they engage to determine whether these are likely to
pollute the marine environment."
Chapter Five provides that States "shall, as far as practicable, assess the
potential effects of [planned] activities on the marine environment" where
there are "reasonable grounds for expecting that [they] may cause substantial pollution of the marine environment," and report the results of such
assessments. This is a good illustration of how a legal development on a
national level, in this case the requirement for environmental impact statements in U.S. law,69 can inspire a parallel development on the international
level.
Chapter Six, regarding standards to prevent, reduce, and control marine
pollution raises perhaps the most difficult issue in this section. It provides
that states "shall establish ...

international rules and standards" regarding

vessel-source pollution; 69 "shall establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures" regarding pollution
from exploration and exploitation of the seabed (continental shelf) and
"from installations under their jurisdiction"; 70 "shall endeavour to establish"
as soon as possible such global and regional measures regarding ocean
dumping; 7' and "shall endeavour to establish" such global and regional
measures regarding pollution from atmospheric sources 72 and "from landbased sources, taking into account characteristic regional features, the
economic capacity of developing countries and their need for economic development." 73
In the case of pollution from landbased and atmospheric sources, states
are required to establish national laws and regulations, "taking into account
internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures." For all sources of marine pollution except landbased and
,6 Id., Art. 9.
67 Id., Art. 10.
(8 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, sec. 102; 83 Stat. 853; 42 U.S.C. 4332.
60 SNT, PAnT HI, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, Art. 20.
7o Id., Art. 17; see algo SNT, PART II, Art. 68.
71 Id., Art. 19.
72 Id., Art. 21.
Ts Id., Art. 16.
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-atmospheric sources, there is a requirement that national laws and regulations "shall be no less effective" than international or generally accepted
rules and standards; with respect to these sources of marine pollution, the
text also applies the "no less effective" rule to internationally "recommended
practices and procedures," although questions were raised in Geneva as to
the appropriateness of applying the rule to recommendations.
The general approach of these articles is to vest the relevant environmental rights and duties in that state which has jurisdiction over the
activity in question. The close relationship between the application of environmental measures and the overall regulation of activities justifies such
an approach. There would be the possibility of interference should another
state be granted such rights and duties. Thus, a coastal state, with respect to seabed exploitation in its economic zone, and a flag state, with
respect to vessels flying its flag, would be obliged to carry out the relevant
environmental duties and would have the right to impose more stringent
environmental measures than those required by the duty to respect international standards. On the other hand, the duty to develop and respect
international standards derives from a recognition of the fact that the state
whose activities are the source of pollution is not necessarily the only state
affected by such pollution; in some cases, it may not even be the most
affected. This is an additional reason for the strong and widespread support for international standards with respect to vessel-source pollution.
Three exceptions to this jurisdictional approach to environmental standards for vessel-source pollution are suggested in Articles 19 and 20 of the
single negotiating text:
(1) Dumping of wastes and other matter within a zone of as yet unspecified distance from the coast would require the express approval of the
coastal state. 74 It can be argued that dumping is not in essence vesselsource pollution but landbased pollution transported to sea, as the issue
of normal vessel operations does not basically arise.
(2) While the language is unclear, it appears that the coastal state
would be permitted to establish "more effective" standards for vessel-source
pollution in its territorial sea provided they do not have the practical
effect of hampering innocent passage.75 There is an apparent inconsistency
of intent with Article 18 in the Committee II text, which would exclude
ship design, construction, manning, and equipment from coastal state
regulation.
(3) Article 20(5) provides:
Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to affect the establishment
by the coastal State of appropriate non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the protection of the marine environment in areas within
the economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions create
obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and where pollution
of the marine environment, according to accepted scientific criteria,
could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological
balance.
7'Id., Art. 19(3).

75 M, Ar 20(3).
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Article 20, paragraphs 4 and 6, also contain a procedure for the coastal
state to obtain international recognition in the competent international
organization for the designation of a "special area" of the economic zone
in which the adoption of special mandatory measures for the prevention of
pollution from vessels is required. Although the language is somewhwat
unclear, it would appear that this is intended as a reference to the international adoption of special discharge rules in "special areas" along the
lines of the 1973 Marine Pollution Convention, where the term "special
area" is used as a term of art. 7
It must be recognized that freedom of navigation in the economic
zone is affected by coastal state rights with respect to vessel-source pollution; this is particularly true with respect to the establishment of standards.
International establishment of standards not only protects environmentally
affected states, it also protects economically affected states. There has
been, and can be, international agreement on the establishment and content
of special standards for particular areas where necessary. However, there
is no assurance that the appropriate balance of interests will be reflected in
a unilateral coastal state decision on such standards, for example as contemplated by Article 20(5).
While the general approach of relying on the state conducting the
activity to enforce international standards is reflected in Chapter Seven,
both juridical and practical questions arise with respect to vessels.
The juridical problems involved in limiting enforcement of vessel-source
pollution laws and regulations to the flag state relate to the rights of the
coastal state in ports and in the territorial sea. A state has the right to
establish conditions of entry to its ports."' In addition, the coastal state
is sovereign, subject to its duty to respect innocent passage, in its territorial
sea. It has certain regulatory rights with respect to innocent passage.Ts
The practical problem relates to the difficulty of ensuring direct environmental supervision by a flag state over its vessels around the world. Thus,
certain special enforcement provisions are contemplated in the single
negotiating text.
First, the duty of the flag state to investigate violations "at the documented request of any State," to bring proceedings, and to impose adequate penalties "regardless of where violations occurred" is emphasized7 9
Secondly, given the fact that pollution enforcement with respect to a
vessel voluntarily in a port does not entail the dangers or practical difficulties of foreign actions against a vessel at sea, substantial enforcement
rights and duties for the port state are contemplated. These include a duty
76 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, IMCO
Doc. MP/CONF./WP.35, Nov. 2, 1973 (not yet in force); 12 ILM 1319 (1973).
T
TSee Territorial Sea Convention, note 11 supra, Art. 16; SNT, PART II, Art. 22(2).
The 1973 Marine Pollution Convention, note 76 supra, refers to specified enforcement
actions by the port state in Articles 5 and 6.
7 Territorial Sea Convention, note 11 supra, Arts. 1, 14, 17; see SNT, PAnr II, Arts.

1, 14, 18.
79 SNT, PAnT I1, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, Art. 26.
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to investigate and report, if there are "reasonable grounds for believing
that a vessel.., has violated the international rules and standards regardless of where the violation occurred"; 80 a right to enforce dumping standards; 81and a right to institute proceedings if a violation of international
discharge standards has occurred in the territorial sea or within an as yet
unspecified distance from the coast of either the port state or another state
which is a party to the Convention containing the relevant standards and
which requests such action by the port state.82 The port state may arrest
the vessel, which is subject to release upon the posting of bond or other
reasonable security;83 the port state must give the flag state six months to
institute proceedings before instituting its own proceedings, and thereafter
cannot proceed if the flag state "has previously commenced proceedings
and has not discontinued those proceedings." 84 Safeguards with respect to
port state proceedings include the vessel-release requirement referred to,
provisions on double jeopardy and "statute of limitations," and a provision permitting only monetary penalties.8 5
Thirdly, if a coastal state has reasonable grounds for believing a vessel
has violated international discharge standards within an as yet unspecified
distance from its coast, it may require identification and other specified
information, including the next port of call, from the vessel "by radio or
6 Where the discharge violation has been
other means of communication." 8
severe
damage or threat of severe damage
causing
of a "flagrant character
to the marine environment, or the vessel is proceeding to or from the
internal waters of the coastal State," the coastal state has the power to
board and inspect.87 It is required to notify the flag state 88 and it can also
request an investigation and proceedings by a port state.80
Chapters Six and Seven "do not affect the legal regime of straits used
for international navigations" as the relevant pollution provisions regarding
transit passage are in the straits articles.9" The same result should presumably apply to "archipelagic sealanes passage" for the same reason.o,
While there is general agreement on the need for safeguards, the actual
enforcement powers of port states and coastal states are likely to continue
to be controversial. For example, the United States and others have
argued that there are sound environmental reasons not to limit port state
enforcement of discharge violations to discharges in specific zones off the
coast. Some will regard the coastal state enforcement rights at sea as too
broad, and others as too restricted. The question of recourse to compulsory dispute settlement to ensure that environmental duties are met and
81 Id., Art. 25.
so Id., Art. 27.
83 Id., Art. 29.
82 Id., Arts. 27-28.
85 Ibid.
84 Id., Art. 28.
87 Id., Art. 31.
8 Id., Art. 30.
89 Id., Art. 28.
88 Id., Art. 32.
90 Id., Art. 39; see SNT, PAT II, Arts. 39, 41.
91 See SNT, PART II, Arts. 125, 128-29.
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that exercise of environmental powers is in conformity with the Convention

is critically related to the substance of the articles.92
The remaining chapters contain provisions on responsibility and liability, 93 vessels entitled to sovereign immunity,9 4 other environmental conventions,' 5 and a general cross-reference to the chapter on compulsory
dispute settlement.98
2. Marbie Scientific Research

Negotiations on the question of research in the economic zone and on
the continental shelf dominated the work of an informal negotiating group
on marine scientific research. They proved very difficult.
The basic difference centered on whether, as proposed in a document
reintroduced with only minor changes on behalf of the Group of 77,97 such
research should be subject to coastal state consent or, as proposed by other
countries, including developed and developing landlocked and geographically disadvantaged countries,9" such research should be subject to certain
obligations to the coastal state, including notification, participation, and
data sharing, with preliminary dispute-settlement procedures to ensure
fulfillment of the obligations prior to undertaking the research project. The
view of the United States was that the conditions for scientific research
should be agreed in the treaty and subject to compulsory dispute settlement in order to protect the interests of the coastal state and the international community and that this obviates the need for and dangers of
consent. Moreover, the fact that drilling for all purposes on the continental
shelf would be controlled exclusively by the coastal state 99 meets the major
arguments for a consent regime.
Early in the session, the U.S.S.R. and other Socialist countries introduced
a formal proposal that would require coastal state consent for research
"related to the exploration and exploitation of living and non-living resources," while other scientific research would be subject to a series of
treaty obligations. 00 The idea of distinguishing between types of research
thereafter dominated the discussions. Needless to say, supporters and
opponents of a consent regime noted the difficulties of making such distinctions but were aware of the potential for accommodation in such an
92SNT, PART III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment. Article
44 provides:
Any dispute with respect to the interpretation or application of the provisions of
this Convention with respect to the preservation of the marine environment shall
of this
be resolved by the dispute settlement procedures contained in Chapter Convention.
94 Id., Art. 42.
93 Id., Art. 41.
96 Id., Art. 44, note 92 s-upra.
05 Id., Art. 43.
97A/CONF.62/C.3/L.13/Rev.l, April 4, 1975; Rev. 2, April 21, 1975; see the earlier
Caracas text, A/CONF.62/C.3/L.13, discussed by the authors at 69 AJIL 28 (1975).
98 A/CONF.62/C.3/L.28, April 24, 1975, amending the Caracas text, A/CONF.62/
C.3/L.19, discussed by the authors at 69 AJIL 28 (1975).
300 A/CONF.62/C.3/L.26, April 3, 1975.
09 SNT, PART II, Art. 67.
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idea. In the closing days of the session, and after prior consultation with
others, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, and Nigeria introduced a proposallol which makes an analogous distinction between resource related
research and fundamental scientific research.
The single negotiating text picks up this general approach. Scientific
research in the economic zone or on the continental shelf would be subject
to such requirements as notice to the coastal state, participation by the
coastal state, provision of data and samples to the coastal state, assistance
to the coastal state in assessing data, samples, and results, and international
dissemination of results. 02 Landlocked and geographically disadvantaged
states in the region would also receive notice and have a right to participate
"whenever feasible." 103
The notice to the coastal state must state whether the research project
is "of a fundamental nature or related to the resources of the economic
zone or continental shelf." ' 0 4 If the project is related to such resources,
it is subject to coastal state consent and additional conditions, including a
duty to "ensure that the research results are not published or made internationally available without the express consent of the coastal state." 101
While this provision reflects the extreme sensitivities of some coastal states
on the issue, the facile assimilation of scientific research regarding resources to commercial exploration is open to question. It is difficult to see
what, if any, conceivable harm to a state which controls all exploitation
could justify this obvious impediment to the acquisition and open dissemination of knowledge about the oceans. An essential element of progress in understanding natural features and processes is comparison; this
requires the broadest possible data base.
Disagreements regarding the question whether research is fundamental
are subject to relevant compulsory dispute-settlement procedures specified
elsewhere in the Convention. 10 There is also a general cross-reference to
the dispute settlement Chapter. 07
The remaining provisions on marine scientific research deal with the
right to conduct scientific research beyond the economic zone and continental shelf, 08 scientific research installations and equipment, 05 and responsibility and liability."10
3. Development and Transfer of Technology
The general provisions on development and transfer of technology establish a duty to cooperate in actively promoting "the development and trans101 A/CONF.62/C.3/L.29, May 6, 1975.

SNT, PART m, Marine Scientific Research, Arts. 15-17, 22.
oa Id., Art. 23.
104 Id., Art. 18.
105 Id., Art. 21.
1o Id., Art. 20.
107 Id., Art. 37.
os Id., Arts. 25, 26; see SNT, PAT I, Art. 10; PAnr II, Art. 75.
109 Id., Arts. 27-33; see SNT, PAnT II, Arts. 48, 66, 75.
"OId., Arts. 34-36.
102
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fer of marine sciences and marine technology at fair and reasonable
terms.""' Specific reference is made to the development of the marine
scientific and technological capacity of developing states. 112 Specific duties
are imposed on all states to "promote the acquisition, evolution and dissemination of marine scientific and technological knowledge," "promote
training and education," especially of developing country nationals, and3
"facilitate access to scientific and technological information and data." 11
The chapter on international cooperation calls, among other things, for
states to "promote the establishment of universally accepted guidelines"
for the transfer of marine technology."
With respect to the international seabed area, the international Authority
would be required to ensure, inter alia, that developing country nationals
"be taken on under training as members of the managerial, research and
technical staff constituted for its undertakings," and would be called upon
to conduct other training and dissemination of information.115 The Committee I text itself deals with transfer of technology and participation of
developing countries in activities in the deep seabed area."" The extent
to which developing country positions in Committee I are in fact motivated by the desire to use the international seabed Authority as a vehicle
for increased participation and training in the development and use of
advanced and highly sophisticated marine technology is unclear. It could
of course be quite relevant to the more industrialized of those countries,
but would not seem very relevant to the development needs and priorities of the less developed or, indeed, the wealthier but as yet unindustrialized states in that group.
SErrTLMENT OF DisPuTs

The single negotiating text on settlement of disputes "is based to a considerable extent on the work of the Informal Group on the Settlement of
Disputes," and "seeks to blend ... the essence of the various alternatives"
presented."" While not official, the Group was open to all Conference participants, was attended at one time or another by representatives from more
than 60 countries, and held announced regular meetings. The Co-Chairmen of the Group consulted informally with the President of the Conference and the Chairmen of the Main Committees on its work.
Some states, including the United States, have publicly stated that agreement on compulsory dispute settlement is an essential element of an overall
"package." There is no reason to believe their position on this issue will
change. There is simply too much room in the treaty for misunderstanding,
abuse of power, and interference with rights on the basis of unilateral
interpretation.

II1 SNT, PART Im, Development and Transfer of Technology, Art.
112

Ibid.

Id., Art. 6.

1.

lis Id., Art. 3.

"5 Id., Art. 9.
SNT, PnTr I, Arts. 11, 18; Annex I, paras. 8(b), 10(b), 12(11).
'IT Note 3, supra.
114
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Since this issue of the Journal fortunately contains an analysis of the
dispute settlement issues and texts by Mr. A. 0. Adede, one of the CoChairmen of the Dispute Settlement Group,"1 8 the authors will confine
themselves to a comment on one of the main issues.
Attempts were made at Geneva to exclude the economic zone as a whole
from compulsory dispute settlement. These attempts were strongly, widely,
and properly resisted. This resistance came from states, like the United
States, that supported provisions protecting the exercise of resource management discretion by the coastal state in accordance with the Convention.119 It is no accident that proponents of a 200-mile territorial sea or
its equivalent were among the active proponents of excluding the economic
zone from dispute settlement. The essential issue is an accommodation
that guarantees not only coastal, but international, rights in the 200-mile
economic zone. If it is the perception of the "territorialists" that an economic zone without compulsory dispute settlement will evolve into a
territorial sea, that may also be the perception and the concern of those
who have major interests in the protection of navigational and other
freedoms.
This is not a peripheral or procedural issue; it is substantive. If states
cannot resort to international adjudicatory procedures to protect their
rights, they are ultimately faced with the same problems arising from unilateral treaty interpretation that arise from unilateral claims. If their own
interests are not adequately protected, what then is the incentive for states
to accept a treaty that will inevitably contain rules designed to accommodate interests they do not share?
Most states have far greater interests in protecting navigation than in
protecting fishing in the economic zones of other states. Without minimizing the importance of compulsory dispute settlement to fishing issues,
it would be foolhardy to expect the majority of coastal states to accept
compulsory dispute settlement with respect to fishing that was not part of
a broader compulsory dispute settlement system which includes navigation.
In this sense, the debate over general and functional approaches to dispute
settlement, discussed by Mr. Adede, has assumed dangerous dimensions.
The question of the type of forum or forums to be used for settling disputes
is not all that difficult to resolve; 120 but the debate is obscuring the broader
118 See A. 0. Adede, Settlement of Disputes Arising under the Law of the Sea Convention, infra p. 798.
19 See SNT (Settlement of Disputes) Art. 18; Working Paper on Settlement of Disputes, Annex I, Art. 17, note 3 supra.
120 Ile question of forum is one basic difference between the general approach to
dispute settlement in Annex I and the functional approach in Annex II of the Working
Paper of the Dispute Settlement Group. In an attempt to accommodate differences
on this matter, Article 6 of the single negotiating text gives preference to special
(that is functional) procedures where the treaty provides for such procedures, and
Article 9 provides that if both parties to the dispute have previously declared that they
accept the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal, or the International Court of Justice,
then "either party may submit the dispute to that tribunal" rather than to the new
Law of the Sea Tribunal.
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issue of acceptance of binding third-party dispute settlement in the economic zone, a matter vital to the success of the Conference.
CONCLUSION

Aspirations for successful completion of the Conference have not been
met in 1975. It remains unclear whether these aspirations will be met in
1976. This depends in part on whether there is sufficient political will to
make the additional accommodations necessary for success, and whether
adequate time is provided for both informal work and Conference sessions.
One eight-week Conference session is almost certainly not enough.
The central procedural manifestation of progress toward a widely acceptable treaty is likely to be the approach taken to the single negotiating
texts. If the Conference is beset by a plethora of amendments from individual states or groups on which it is compelled to take formal action, the
chances for its early and successful completion will be reduced. There are
simply too many points, some seemingly minor, where isolated decisions
could preclude general agreement. On the other hand, if there is a frank
and realistic assessment of the extent to which the texts do not reflect an
adequate basis for widespread agreement and intensive negotiation designed to resolve the problems by widely agreed amendments, the chances
for success are substantial.

